



By TED LEWIS

Washington, April 25.—The resignation of Allen Dulles as Central Intelligence Agency chief can now be expected. Not immediately, but certainly within two or three months. This is considered inevitable even by his many friends and admirers, who consider it one of the tragic, unavoidable consequences of the Cuban invasion fiasco.

It has become clear that there must be a change of command in the CIA. Restoration of confidence in the agency is vital because intelligence that can be absolutely relied on must be available in the cold war.

The CIA, true enough, has simply made one error of judgment. With all its other global activities, it still may produce the most solid information available. But in view of Cuba, who now will depend on it without question? There can never again be confidence in estimates of Russian potential or plans from the CIA under Dulles.

In the past, there have been occasions when CIA intelligence was challenged. In most instances, however, these questionings involved Senators and representatives who found the CIA disagreed with their own estimates and claimed that military and other intelligence sources were more reliable. Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), always took sharp issue, for example, with CIA secret data on the indicated rate of Russian missile production or Russian war plans.

The need for restoring public confidence in and Congressional acceptance of authoritative CIA intelligence has been realized by President Kennedy. Hence his decision to name Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Dulles and Adm. Arleigh Burke to the job of reviewing U. S. intelligence, para-military and guerrilla warfare capabilities.


There is on the surface little clarity about the intent of this emergency project. It is, however, actually a simple mission, although the final recommendations will be easier for experts to understand than for the average citizen.

A Buildup, but CIA Won't Do It

There will definitely be a buildup of our specially trained guerrilla forces and other special units capable of carrying on "unconventional warfare." This latter kind of fighting has many variations. The recent Cuban invasion, even if it burst like a bubble, was an unconventional war. It was financed by U. S. funds, its intelligence sources were those of the CIA. The blood was shed by Cubans, the tactics and strategy devised basically by U. S. experts.

There is no doubt here that the Taylor investigation will result in a CIA which functions as a purely intelligence establishment, not with delegated operational responsibility to take charge of a military invasion or a guerrilla infiltration project. Whoever in authority ever had the stupid idea that a good spy or secret agent would be a capable battalion leader?

Until this Taylor investigation is finished and Kennedy orders its findings put into effect, American intelligence as carried out by the CIA is going to be suspect. This is a critical situation. If we are unsure of what Khrushchev is up to, how can we have confidence in our own cold war military plans, in our diplomatic moves on the delicate global stage?



Allen Dulles
Know of any jobs open?

Did Nothing Wrong, They Contend

It seems almost unbelievable that in the aftermath of the Cuban incident there are those in high positions in the CIA who still deny that there is any reason for loss of confidence in the intelligence apparatus.

To the utter amazement of a group of private citizens familiar with the Cuban situation, several important Administration officials have claimed that the CIA made no mistake in Cuba and had absolutely the correct information on Castro's military strength.

Even the timing of the invasion was not admitted to have been a mistake.

It is hard to realize that this view is being peddled in utmost seriousness. More seemly would have been an honest admission: "Yes we made a mistake. Who doesn't?"

Instead, we have the amusing confession that we (the CIA) just don't know where things went wrong, they simply shouldn't.

A fair hindsight question: "You made no mistake, you say. Do you mean that you accurately gauged the pulse of the Cuban people? If so, how come they failed to rally to the flag of the anti-Castro leaders?"

On the Key Question, All Is Vague

Only a fuzzy response comes to this question—which after all is the key point.

There have also been in the last few days a series of briefings under CIA auspices to show that the gathering of intelligence is an inexact science.

Material from spies, paid agents—some trustworthy, some not—has to be "evaluated." Then the experts try to come up with a logical answer. Obviously, this is not a precise procedure. But in the last few years it is less an inexact science than it used to be.

There certainly should have been continued improvements in intelligence evaluation and planning. Otherwise, what are we buying with the \$600 million to \$700 million we spend annually for our secret intelligence operation?

There have of course been many grave errors in intelligence through history. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor (before CIA was established) is among the most glaring. Failure of intelligence to predict that the Chinese Red armies would cross the Yalu River in the Korean War was another.

As the Civil War buffs know, Robert E. Lee might have won the Battle of Gettysburg but for lack of intelligence. He had depended on Jeb Stuart and his cavalry to be the "eyes" of the Confederate army. Jeb passed up that prosaic task, preferring to gallop off on an expedition of his own.